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A CENTURY LOST: THE END OF THE
ORIGINALISM DEBATE
Eric J. Segall*
"I happen to like originalist arguments when the weight
of the evidence seems to support the constitutional out,J
comes Ifiavor ....
INTRODUCTION
Almost one hundred years ago, Professor Arthur W. Machen published an article in the Harvard Law Review called The
Elasticity of the Constitution. 2 In this two-part article, which until
now has been buried in history,3 Professor Machen explored the
relationship between a fixed Constitution and an ever-changing
society and advanced three propositions about originalism and
constitutional interpretation. First, judges must attempt to ascertain the original meaning of the Constitution whenever they
4
exercise judicial review. Second, a political practice determined
by judges to be constitutional may later be invalidated by judges,
and vice-versa, because the facts to which the original principles
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State College of the Law. I would like to
thank Bill Edmundson, Barry Friedman, Lynn Hogue, Steve Kaminshine, Chuck Marvin,
Natsu Saito, Suzanna Sherry, and Patrick Wiseman for helpful comments on an earlier
draft. I also owe great appreciation to my research assistant Nancy Greenwood.
1. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution xv n.* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) (cited in Laura Kalman, Border Patrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal Scholarship, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 87, 123 (1997)).
2. Arthur W. Machen, The Elasticity of the Constitution (pts. 1 & 2), 14 Harv. L.
Rev. 200, 273 (1900). This article was placed in two different parts of the volume but was
clearly intended to form one unified piece. Professor Machen was a Professor at the
University of Chicago where he wrote mostly about corporate law. See Arthur W. Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 253 (1911). I could only find one other
article he wrote on constitutional law. See Arthur W. Machen, Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void?, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 169 (1910).
3. A Westlaw search performed on September 20, 1998, revealed only one citation
to this article, which simply identified Professor Machen as an originalist. See Terry
Brennan, Natural Rights and the Constitution: The Original "Original Intent", 15 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol. 965,'967 n.6 (1992).
4. See Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 203 (cited in note 2).
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are applied are constantly changing. 5 Third, the Framers might
originally have believed that the meaning of vague constitutional
provisions, like the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual punishments," would not be fixed as of the date of enactment, but should be fleshed out by judges over time according to
the values of succeeding generations. 6
Professor Machen's article demonstrates that he was what
modern scholars refer to as a "sophisticated" originalist. 7 He
believed the examination of original meaning is not the search
for what the Framers specifically had in mind when they drafted
the text, but rather for the general and reasonable meaning of
8
the language they used. Moreover, Professor Machen knew
there would be many constitutional questions originalism cannot
answer. 9 In such cases, judges must turn to other "rules of construction" and "positive law," which inevitably provide them
significant discretion to determine the proper results in difficult
cases. 10
This essay argues that the academic debate over the legitimacy of originalist and non-originalist constitutional interpretation has not progressed materially since Professor Machen's article.11 Furthermore, a review of his work teaches us that
originalism does not lead inevitably to active or passive judicial
review; that questions about originalism as an interpretive tool
are largely irrelevant to how judges decide real cases; and that
there is little reason for scholars to continue to argue about the
12
proper role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation.
5. ld. at 273-75.
6. ld. at 283.
7. See David Crump, How do the Courts Really Discover Unenumerated Fundamental Rights? Cataloguing the Methods of Judicial Alchemy, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol.
795,823-28 (1996) (discussing "sophisticated" versions of originalism).
8. See Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 211-13 (cited in note 2).
9. ld. at 215.
10. See id.
11. For the purposes of this essay, I will define "originalist" constitutional interpretation to mean the belief that the original meaning of the Constitution is an essential
component of constitutional analysis, and "non-originalist" constitutional interpretation
as the belief that the search for the original meaning is not particularly relevant to constitutional interpretation. My argument is that there is little or no difference between people who say they are originalists and people who say they aren't when it comes to actually
applying the original meaning of the Constitution to specific cases. See notes 124-131
and accompanying text.
12. See Part 1(c) infra. See also Michael Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 Va. L. Rev. 669, 673 (1991); Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism as Transformative Politics, 63 Tul. L. Rev. 1599, 1603 (1989). These
articles, written almost ten years ago, both argued that the originalism debate was largely
spent. Unfortunately, this message has not been well-received, as law professors con-
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That role should be as clear to us as it was to Professor Machen-judges refer to the original meaning of the Constitution to
provide an important link to our past culture and traditions, but
the original meaning rarely dictates results in real cases because
the context within which that meaning is applied is constantly
changing.
The first part of this Essay supports these points by comparing Professor Machen's article to a recent argument among
two of our most prominent legal thinkers, Justice Antonin Scalia
and Professor Ronald Dworkin. 13 This comparison demonstrates
that the debate over originalism has not moved forward in almost one hundred years. The second part of this essay discusses
the academic debate over originalism and desegregation. This
debate, perhaps more than any other, illustrates the futility of
scholarly attempts to criticize or justify important Supreme
Court decisions on an originalist basis, and supports my thesis
that there is little reason for scholars to continue to argue about
the appropriate role of original meaning in constitutional interpretation.
I. THE ORIGINALISM DEBATE
A. ARTHUR W. MACHEN

In 1900, there were only three university-affiliated law reviews-the Harvard Law Review, the Yale Law Journal, and the
American Law Review, which was the predecessor to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. As of that year, there had
been only a handful of articles ever written on the subject of
14
constitutional theory. Nevertheless, Professor Machen's article
exhaustively explored the originalism question. Here is how this
extraordinary article began:
tinue to argue about the relevance of original meaning. See, e.g., Symposium, Originalism, Democracy, and the Constitution, IY Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 237-531 (IYY6); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Originalism in Constitutional Interpretation, 25 Fed. L. Rev. I {1997);
Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable Past, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 601 (1YY5); Paul Horwitz, The Past, Tense: The History of Crisis-and the Crisis of History-In Constitutional
Theory, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 459 (IYY7).
13. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton U. Press, I YY7) ("Interpretation") (including a Comment by Ronald Dworkin, among
others).
14. The most famous article, of course, is James Bradley Thayer's, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893). See
Symposium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium,
88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1-461 {1993).
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As the period of the formation of the American Union becomes more and more remote, it becomes constantly more
important to inquire to what extent the decision of a question
of federal constitutional law may properly be affected by the
many changes in language, customs, morals, and in individual
and national environment which have taken place since the
adoption of our fundamental law. . . . Political opinions have
changed: the doctrine of national unity has almost completely
demolished its once mighty antagonist-the theory of state
sovereignty. Commerce, instead of being conducted by stagecoaches and sail-boats, is carried on by railways, telegraphs,
and ocean liners. Ideas of morality have changed: lotteries
and duelling, once regarded as praiseworthy, are now thought
pernicious and immoral. The effect of all these changes upon
our system of constitutional law is surely an interesting and
important matter for legal inquiry. . . . The present paper
deals with the problems which arise when a constitution, the
letter of which remains unchan?ed, is to be applied by the
courts to an altered state of facts. 1

After framing the issue, Professor Machen asked whether
"it [is] ever possible to justify a departure from the original intention? Can the Constitution be changed, silently and without
16
formal amendments?" He addressed this question by distinguishing two different "schools of opinion" regarding the interpretation of constitutional language. 17 One school, the "strict
and literal constructionists," looked only to the "dictionary
meaning" of the Constitution's words to discover the intentions
of the Framers. 18 The other school, the "broad constructionists,"
believed in looking for the "actual intent" of the Framers in
whatever way possible, sometimes giving a "forced or ungram19
matical" meaning to the Constitution's words. Although they
employed different means, both schools were in agreement that,
20
if ascertainable, the intentions of the Framers are "sovereign. "
Professor Machen next considered whether there were any
exceptions to the rule that the Framers' intentions, if discoverable, must control constitutional interpretation. He suggested
that "the most plausible ground for violating the intention of the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 200 (cited in note 2) (emphasis added).
ld. at 201.
!d. at 203.
Id.
ld.
Id.
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framers is to be found in considerations of expediency." He
outlined the argument that modern commentators have recycled
as the "dead hand" argument: "[t]o follow out precisely in all
cases the will of men who lived over a century ago may, in certain contingencies, from the standpoint of policy, be extremely
undesirable." 22 The Constitution, the supporters of this view argued, was intended by the Framers to be "elastic and adaptable
to changed conditions," and it must be "a living, growing organism, capable of adapting itself to all the multiplex conditions in
which the nation may be involved." 23 The Framers, according to
this view, could not have intended that a political instrument designed to "endure through all time should always bear the same
25
construction." 24 The Constitution "is not dead but living."
Professor Machen rejected these arguments. If the intent of
the Framers could be evaded for reasons of policy, he argued,
the Constitution would lose its force as binding law. He suggested that there is no "middle ground" between following the
Framers' intentions and deviating from those intentions for policy reasons. 26 Although an originalist doctrine might hamper the
operations of the government, the alternative would give the judiciary the power to alter the Constitution and place the courts
above the Constitution. That result would jeopardize our system
of government and threaten the advantages of being governed
by a "fixed organic law." 27
Professor Machen anticipated the objection that the Framers were not of one mind on many matters and therefore the
search for their specific intentions would be difficult, if not impossible. He responded that the search is not for the Framers'
specific intentions which "if admissible at all, are received
merely as evidencing the intention which the words, construed in
light of the surrounding circumstances, reasonably express. " 28
Instead, it is this "expressed intention" which judges must try to
ascertain when deciding difficult cases. 29
Professor Machen acknowledged that his discussion of
originalism was predicated on the assumption that in a particular
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

!d. at 204.
!d.
!d. at 204-05.
Id. at 204.
!d. at 205.
!d. at 205-06.
!d. at 205-07.
!d. at 211.
!d.
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case the Framers' intentions could be ascertained. He conceded
that the "imperfection and vagueness of human language [and]
the difficulty of placing ourselves in the position of men who
lived so long ago," causes great difficulty for "the interpreter of
the Constitution." 30 When the intentions are unclear, Professor
Machen suggested, judges should rely on practical rules of construction, and legislative and administrative practice, to decide
constitutional issues. Even in such cases, however, Professor
Machen warned against using modern notions of expediency to
decide interpretive questions. Although he recognized a judge
will "almost inevitably be unconsciously influenced by his
knowledge of the immediate ill effects which a theoretically correct judgment might produce," he hoped that judges would not
take into account policy considerations that would not have been
accepted by the Framers. 31 Otherwise, judges might reach a different interpretation of the language than would a court sitting
immediately after the nation was formed. 32 This practice, according to Professor Machen, "should never be followed. " 33
In Part I of his article, Professor Machen sounds like a strict
originalist. He urged judges to use all available tools to discover
what the words of the Constitution meant at the time they were
written, and argued that contemporary policy considerations
should be ignored in determining those intentions. If those intentions are undiscoverable, standard rules of construction and
deference to the political branches should guide constitutional
decision-making. Contemporary originalists such as Judge Bork
and Justice Scalia would find little to complain about in this advice to judges. 34 As we will see shortly, however, Part II of Professor Machen's article undercuts much of his reliance on originalism.
Professor Machen began the second part of his article with
the acknowledgment that, even when judges apply the rule that
the original intentions of the Framers control constitutional interpretation, it "does not follow that an act which was unconstitutional one hundred years ago must necessarily be so held today. " 35 Although the construction of the Constitution by judges

30. Id. at 215.
31. ld. at 216.
32. ld.
33. Id.
34. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the
Law (Free Press, 1990) ("Tempting"); Scalia, Interpretation at 38,45-46 (cited in note 13).
35. Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 273 (cited in note 2).
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must not change, the validity of legislative acts often turns on the
factual context of a case, which may be completely different
from one generation to the next. According to Professor Machen:
The separation of the law from the facts is a difficult but transcendently important task. For while denying in the most unqualified terms the notion that the Constitution is capable of a
varying construction, we may often be swayed by the same arguments advanced in favor of that heresy, and even reach the
same results, but in a perfectly legitimate way, simply by a careful discrimination between matters of law and fact. The law of
the Constitution remains forever unchanginJ: the facts to
which it must be applied are infinitely various.

Professor Machen provided as an example of this thesis the
case of margarine. He suggested that a law passed at the behest
of margarine sellers in the year 1900 forbidding the sale of butter
would be construed by the courts as an arbitrary denial of due
process of law. But if the facts changed and people began to
prefer margarine to butter, and the same people were concerned
that sellers of butter were trying to pass off that product as margarine, then on "those facts ... the legislature might constitutionally prohibit the manufacture and sale of butter ... just as
acts absolutely forbidding the sale or manufacture of oleomargarine are now ... upheld. " 37 In that circumstance, the interpretation of the Constitution has not changed-the same definition of
'due process' would be given. It is the facts which would have
changed. " 38
Pursuant to this analysis, identical laws in different states
might be treated differently by the Supreme Court. Professor
Machen questioned the Supreme Court case of Brass v. Stoeser, 39
in which the Court held that a grain elevator in a small town was
subject to reasonable regulation in light of a prior case involving
elevators in New York City and Buffalo. 40 The Court rejected
the plaintiff's argument in Stoeser that the facts of its case were
different because of the small-town nature of its business, on the
basis that the plaintiff's argument raised "purely legislative" considerations.41 Professor Machen took issue with that reasoning,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. (emphasis added).
ld. at 274 (citing Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1887)).
Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 275 (cited in note 2).
153 u.s. 391 (1894).
Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 276 (cited in note 2).
ld.
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arguing that individual factual circumstances should control the
constitutionality of the law at issue in Stoeser because the "habits, manners, opinions and needs of the people of the several
states are so widely divergent that what would be arbitrary in
one state at one time may, at the same time in another state, or
at another time in the same state, be harmless and even benefi42
cent. "
Professor Machen conceded that these kinds of factual considerations and distinctions are "more legislative than judicial."43
Moreover, this kind of analysis "opens up to the courts many
44
matters unsuited for judicial discussion. " American judges must
realize, however, that many problems of government that in
other countries would be resolved by legislatures are submitted
here to federal judges. 45
Professor Machen also argued that the relevance of changed
circumstances to constitutional decision-making often depends
on difficult questions of interpretation of the Constitution's language and history. For example, he asked whether the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments"
meant "unusual when the amendment was adopted, or unusual
46
when the punishment is inflicted. " Professor Machen did not
resolve this question. He noted that all of "the familiar arguments in favor of an 'elastic constitution' may be urged in support of that construction [which tests constitutionality as of the
time the punishment is imposed]. The fact that the Constitution
was intended to endure perpetually, the importance of leaving
the legislature ... free to adopt such measures as the sentiment
of the people may permit or require-these are legitimate reasons for interpreting 'unusual' to mean unusual when the penalty
47
is exacted." Professor Machen noted that there were counterarguments, however, and he concluded that "either interpretation is permissible, and that either may be adopted without conflicting with the sound theory of constitutional construction; and
48
that the same thing is true in other similar cases."
At the end of his article, Professor Machen summarized his
theory of constitutional interpretation as follows: 1) the inten42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citations omitted).
at 277 (citation omitted).
at 280.
at 283 (citation omitted).
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tions of the Framers must always prevail (absent stare decisis
concerns); 2) the construction of the Constitution, being dependent on the fixed intentions of the Framers, never changes;
but 3) a law which is valid at one time may be invalid at another,
and vice versa, because of a change in the facts to which the law
49
is applied.
Many contemporary commentators echo much of Professor
Machen's analysis. First, the legal principles embodied in the
Constitution, as evidenced by the text and the intentions of the
Framers, do not change. 50 Second, the constitutionality of actions of the political branches and the states do vary over time
51
because society and its values are constantly in flux.
Third,
there are constitutional provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment, which the Framers might have originally intended to have
a variable meaning over time. 52 Finally, although the search is
for the original meaning of the text, the difficulty of reconstrll:ctin~ that meaning poses a serious obstacle to the originalist
proJect.
The remainder of this essay is devoted to sustaining three
points about this analysis. First, virtually all judges and scholars
agree with these statements about constitutional interpretation;
second, this analysis gives us little guidance in describing how
specific constitutional cases should be decided; and third, after
recognizing these points, there is almost nothing left of interest
to say about the originalism question.
B. THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE

Almost one hundred years after Professor Machen wrote his
article, Justice Scalia delivered the Tanner Lectures at Princeton
University, and Professor Ronald Dworkin, among others, was
invited to respond to Scalia's comments. These lectures were
54
later consolidated into a book. Although the subject of these
49. Id. at 284.
50. See Scalia, Interpretation at 40 (cited in note 13).
51. See Bork, Tempting at 169 (cited in note 34) (explaining that even though the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought segregation was legally permissible,
changed circumstances pertaining to the importance of public school education and the
impossibility of truly equal separate schools justified the Brown decision).
52. See Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in Scalia, Interpretation at 120-21 (cited in note
13).
53. See Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol. 437, 440 (1996) (stating that for most constitutional issues, "careful historical
analysis of the same evidence may yield opposite conclusions.").
54. See Scalia, Interpretation (cited in note 13).
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talks went beyond the originalism debate and even constitutional
interpretation, the main focus for most of the participants was
judicial interpretation of vague constitutional language. Our
discussion begins with Justice Scalia's initial remarks.
1. Justice Scalia

Like Professor Machen, Justice Scalia argued that judges
engaged in constitutional interpretation should look for "the
original meaning of the text, not what the original draftsmen in55
tended. "
Scalia stated that he consults the writings of the
Framers, not because their intentions are authoritative, but because those writings, like the works of other informed people of
the time, shed light on how the Constitution was originally understood. But the key is the text, not the intentions of those who
drafted the text, otherwise "democratically adopted texts" will
be "mere springboards for judicial lawmaking. "56
Scalia then noted that the "Great Divide" in constitutional
interpretation is between those who believe in looking to the
original meaning of the Constitutional text, and those who look
at its current meaning. 57 The latter believe in what Scalia, like
Professor Machen, called a "Living Constitution," which grows
from generation to generation and allows judges to determine
the needs of an ever-changing society. 58 According to Scalia,
those who believe in the "Living Constitution" have transformed
constitutional interpretation into a common law method of adjudication. Judges decide cases by examining precedent to determine whether the logic of prior cases should be extended to the
new case based on what result the judges prefer in the case at
hand. 59 Under this interpretive regime, Justice Scalia argued,
"what the Constitution meant yesterday is not necessarily what it
means today." 60
Scalia claimed to disagree with this method of constitutional
interpretation. 61 He argued that a Constitution does not suggest
55. Id. at 38.
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 38.
58. ld. See also Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 204 (cited in note 2).
59. This descriptive account of constitutional interpretation is very much in vogue
and I think extremely accurate. See Eric J. Segall, The Skeptic's Constitution, 44 UCLA
L. Rev. 1467, 1504 (1997) (citing David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877,879 (1996)).
60. Scalia, Interpretation at 39-40 (cited in note 13).
61. For examples of Scalia applying the methodology he criticizes, see notes 99-107,
and accompanying text.
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changeability, but rather "its whole purpose is to prevent
change-to embed certain rights in such a manner that future
generations cannot readily take them away .... Neither the text
of such a document nor the intent of its framers ... can possibly
lead to the conclusion that its only effect is to take the power of
changin5 rights away from the legislature and give it to the
courts."
Like Professor Machen, Scalia acknowledged that the principal argument in favor of a "Living Constitution" is expediency-we need a flexible Constitution that can bend and grow
with changing problems and concerns. Also like Professor Machen, Scalia rejected this rationale. 63 The problem, according to
Scalia, is that there is no agreement on what principles are to
govern the evolution of constitutionally imposed restrictions on
government. Should a judge decide cases based on the "will of
the majority, discerned from newspapers. . . . Is it the philosophy of Hume, or of John Rawls, or of John Stuart Mill, or of
Aristotle?" 64 The "evolutionists," as Scalia called them, are divided "into as many camps as there are individual views of the
good, the true, and the beautiful. ... which means that evolutionism is simply not a practicable constitutional philosophy." 6;
Scalia has made these points before in his writing. 66 His answer is what he calls a "faint-hearted" originalist approach to
constitutional interpretation, which he conceded often leaves
room for significant disagreement among judges and scholars.67
He provided as an example the application of the First Amendment to new technologies and suggested that such a task is not
mechanical but requires judgment. Nevertheless, he argued that
the difficulties of applying originalism pale compared to the
problems of interpreting a Constitution that changes over time.
He described those problems as follows:
The originalist, if he does not have all the answers, has many
of them . . . . For the evolutionist, on the other hand, every
question is an open question, every day a new day. No fewer
than three of the Justices with whom I have served have maintained that the death penalty is unconstitutional, even though

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
("Scalia,
67.

Scalia, Interpretation at 40-41 (cited in note 13).
!d. at 41,44-45.
!d. at 45.
!d.
See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989)
Origina/ism").
!d. at 862, 864.
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its use is explicitly contemplated in the Constitution. . . . No
matter. Under The Living Constitution the death penalty
may have become unconstitutional. And it is up to each Justice to decide for himself (under no standard I can discern)
when that occurs. 68

Justice Scalia's theory of constitutional interpretation tracks
the originalism discussed in Part I of Professor Machen's article.
He agrees with Professor Machen that constitutional principles
do not change over time, even if sometimes it is difficult to identify those principles and apply them to unforseen circumstances.
As we will see from Professor Dworkin's response, however,
Scalia's originalism, like the originalism discussed in Part II of
Professor Machen's article, does very little work in hard constitutional cases.
2. Ronald Dworkin
Professor Dworkin responded to Scalia by making a distinction between "semantic originalism" and "expectation originalism. ""Y A semantic originalist believes that constitutional
provisions should be interpreted according to what the drafters
intended to say. An expectation originalist, however, interprets
those provisions according to what specific consequences the
70
Framers expected them to have. Dworkin used the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to illustrate this
distinction. An expectation originalist would argue that the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not expect that
Amendment to prohibit segregated schools, and therefore
71
Brown v. Board of Education, was incorrectly decided. A semantic originalist, on the other hand, would try to discover what
the Framers intended to say when they adopted the Fourteenth
Amendment-what general principle they were setting forth.
This inquiry would lead to the identification of a broad principle
of political equality which, by 1954, condemned racial segregation. Therefore, a semantic originalist could agree with the
Brown decision. 72 In other words, although the principle embodied by the Fourteenth Amendment would not change, the
factual context to which it applied might change, and what peo-

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Scalia, Interpretation at 46 (cited in note 13) (emphasis in original).
Dworkin, Comment at 119 (cited in note 52).
Id.
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
Dworkin, Comment at 119 (cited in note 52).
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pie considered equal in 1865 might be deemed unequal in 1954.
This sounds similar to Part II of Professor Machen's article
where he discussed how changed circumstances might lead to the
3
invalidation of a practice judges once ruled constitutionaC
Dworkin asserted that if Scalia were faithful to his textualist-originalist approach to constitutional interpretation he would
be a semantic originalist. He wouldn't look to what specific consequences the Framers intended, but rather to what they actually
said in the Constitutional text under consideration. But Dworkin argued Scalia's own example of the death penalty demonstrates that Scalia will look to the Framers' subjective intentions,
74
not just to the words they wrote.
Scalia argued that the death penalty cannot be unconstitutional because the Fifth Amendment provides that no person
shall be deprived of life without due process of law, and also re75
quires a grand jury indictment for capital crimes. Therefore,
the Framers must have believed the death penalty was constitutional despite the Eighth Amendment. Dworkin argued, however, that a true semantic originalist, a person who cared more
about the text of the Eighth Amendment than what its Framers
believed it to mean, would have to determine whether the ban
on cruel and unusual punishments meant cruel and unusual at
the time of the adoption of the Amendment or cruel and unusual
when the sentence was actually imposed. This is the precise is76
sue raised by Professor Machen in his article. Dworkin, like
Machen, argued that this question is a difficult one, and that
therefore Scalia's biting criticism of those Justices who believe
the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment is inconsistent
with a strong textualist-originalist approach to constitutional interpretation.
Dworkin also took Scalia to task for his remarks about the
Fourteenth Amendment. Scalia argued in his initial comments
that the Equal Protection Clause allowed distinctions based on
gender when it was adopted, as well as in 1920, and therefore
77
should be interpreted the same way today. Dworkin conceded
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment probably did not
78
expect it to apply to gender. He argued, however, that a true
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 273-75 (cited in note 2).
Dworkin, Comment at 120-21 (cited in note 52).
Scalia, Interpretation at 46 (cited in note 13).
See note 46 and accompanying text.
See Dworkin, Comment at 125-26 (cited in note 52).
Id. at 125.
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semantic originalist would dismiss those expectations as evidence of what the Framers thought would happen and instead
pay more careful attention to the language the Framers actually
used. And that language, "equal protection of the laws," does
not make a distinction between racial and sexual discrimination.
The text is "perfectly abstract, general, and principled. " 79 Scalia,
contrary to his own statements, "reads into [the] language limitations that the language not only does not suggest but cannot
bear, and he tries to justify this mistranslation by attributing understandings and expectations to statesmen that they may well
have had, but that left no mark on the text they wrote." 80
So, Dworkin asks, why does the "resolute text-reader, dictionary-minder, expectation scorner," change his mind when it
comes to the "most fundamental American statute of them
all?"~ Dworkin hypothesized that a true textualist-originalist
would conclude that many of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
were written so generally and vaguely that the Framers must
have intended them to be interpreted over time. Had the Framers intended these provisions to have a fixed meaning, they
would have written them differently, more specifically. Of
course, this generally means that judges will have great discretion to interpret those phrases, which explains why many modern-day conservatives, like Justice Scalia, reject semantic originalism-it affords judges too much power. But Scalia has
already rejected lookini: at the expectations of the Framers at
the expense of the text. 2 Scalia's textualism-originalism, therefore, is selective and inconsistent. A true originalist, according
to Dworkin, would interpret the Constitution the way the Framers intended-as embodying broad principles that judges must
apply t? differini, fact~al situations by e~ploying in~epe_ndent
moral judgment.- This "magnet of pohttcal morahty IS the
strongest force in jurisprudence," and the Constitution reflects
that principle in its broad provisions protecting liberty and
equality.l<4
1

79.
80.

!d. at 126.
!d.
8L !d. Scalia agrees with Dworkin about the importance of the Equal Protection
Clause. See Antonio Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1178 (1989). For a fuller discussion, see Eric Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies,
and the Rule of Law, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 991, 1000 (1994).
82. See notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
83. See Dworkin, Comment at 126 (cited in note 52).
84. !d. at 127.
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Dworkin's response to Scalia sounds similar to Part II of
Professor Machen's article. In fact, Dworkin's "semantic originalist," would do exactly what Professor Machen suggestedidentify the broad principles set forth by the Framers of the
Constitution and apply those principles to an ever-changing
society. 85 Because circumstances do change, a practice like
segregation that judges once considered constitutional may later
be deemed by them to be unconstitutional if what society once
considered equal under the law may at a future time be
considered unequal. 86 The relevant principle remains the same,
equality, but its specification in particular cases inevitably
changes over time.
In his response, Scalia accepted the distinction between semantic-originalism and expectation-originalism and even con87
ceded that he embraces the former. Scalia also agreed with
Dworkin that the Eighth Amendment contains an abstract principle prohibiting cruel and unusualsfunishments not a "highlyparticularistic" and "concrete" rule. That is why Scalia said he
would invalidate tortures that were unknown when the Constitution was written.89 Scalia disagreed with Dworkin, however, as
to whether the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment to be a
time-dated rule with a fixed meaning or a variable standard that
changes depending upon the current generation's moral precepts. On this question, Scalia suggested that broad moral principles, unlike more specific factual assessments, are permanent.
He stated that "[t]he Americans of 1791 surely thought that what
was cruel was cruel, regardless of what ... future generation[s]
might think about it." 90 Moreover, he argued that if the Bill of
Rights does not install permanent law-like rules but rather
vague, aspirational moral precepts, why should federal judges be
its ultimate interpreters? 91
This disagreement between Justice Scalia and Ronald
Dworkin over whether the Eighth Amendment specifically, and
the Constitution generally, should be interpreted as time-dated
or not, fails to advance the originalism debate beyond Professor
Machen's discussion. As noted earlier, Professor Machen also
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
Dworkin, Comment at 119 (cited in note 52).
Scalia, Interpretacion at 144 (cited in note 13).
!d.
ld. at 145.
ld. at 146.
ld. at 147-48.
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questioned whether the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted as having a fixed or variable meaning, and he said:
[W]henever the Constitution, expressly or by implication, refers to custom or opinion, the framers may have meant that
prevailing either when the instrument was adopted or when it
was interpreted and applied. If the latter construction be
adopted, a change in custom or opinion might make a difference in the constitutionality of a statute. Otherwise, it could
have no such effect. Thus, the Eighth Amendment forbids
'cruel and unusual punishments.' Does this mean unusual
when the amendment was adopted, or unusual when the punishment is inflicted? The word was capable of either meaning.
If the latter be correct, the lapse into disuse of a punishment
formerly prevalent may be material in deciding whether at the
present day it falls within the inhibition of the amendment,
and a punishment once legal may perhaps be held now unconstitutional. If, however, the other construction be chosen, the
frequency or infrequency with which the particular penalty is
now imposed becomes wholly irrelevant. ...
[E]ither interpretation is permissible, and ... either may be
adopted without conflicting with the sound theory of constitutional construction. 92

How is it that Justice Scalia and Ronald Dworkin arrive in
exactly the same place as Professor Machen did one hundred
years earlier, disagreeing over whether the Eighth Amendment
lays down a rule frozen in time as of the date of enactment or a
variable standard to be applied by later generations as they see
fit? In the next section, I suggest they ended up in the same
place because the question all three men asked, what role original meaning should play in constitutional interpretation, has
limited utility and does not in practice generate truly different
methods of constitutional interpretation.
C. ANALYSIS
Professor Machen argued that, whenever the Framers' intentions could be ascertained, original meaning should guide
constitutional interpretation. Neither Justice Scalia nor Profes93
sor Dworkin would disagree with that statement. Professor
Machen further pointed out that the original meaning of the text
does not change from one generation to the next; otherwise the
92.
93.

Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 280,283 (cited in note 2).
See notes 61-66,81-84 and accompanying text.
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Constitution would lose its status as the fundamental law of the
land. 94 Neither Justice Scalia nor Professor Dworkin would disagree with that statement. In fact, Professor Dworkin argued
that the notion that the Bill of Rights contains provisions that
"are chameleons which change their meaning to conform to the
needs and spirit of new times ... is hardly even intelligible, and I
know of no prominent contemporary judge or scholar who holds
anything like it." 95 Finally, Professor Machen raised the question
whether vague constitutional provisions such as the Eighth
Amendment should be interpreted to lay down fixed time-dated
rules or broad, general principles that must be applied by judges
9
according to the morality of the interpreting generation. This
question, he said, is a difficult one that must be answered by
looking at the meaning the provision bore when adopted.
Again, neither Justice Scalia nor Professor Dworkin disagree
that this is the relevant inquiry. They only purport to disagree
. 97
over t he answer to the questiOn.
If Justice Scalia actually applied a rigorous originalist approach to constitutional interpretation that did not take into account changed circumstances, and if he only invalidated political
decisions that were inconsistent with the specific intent of the
Framers, then there might be an important difference between
Justice Scalia's and Ronald Dworkin's views on originalism. The
problem is that Justice Scalia, like virtually all judges, does not
apply a rigorous originalist approach to cases he actually decides.
He has invalidated political decisions without clear evidence that
those decisions were inconsistent with original understandings. 98
For example, numerous commentators have pointed out that
Scalia's takings jurisprudence is completely inconsistent with the
original understanding that only a physical imposition consti99
tuted a constitutional violation. Additionally, his votes to overturn flag burning laws, hate speech laws, and affirmative action

94. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
95. See Dworkin, Comment at 122 (cited in note 52).
96. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
97. See notes 76-84, 90-91 and accompanying text.
98. I have previously argued that Scalia's judicial project is centered more on the
articulation of clear rules than any real commitment to originalism or textualism. See
Segall, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 1004 (cited in note 81).
99. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 40 (1997); William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with
Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1393-94 (1993); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782,804-09
(1995).
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programs cannot be reconciled with a strictly originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. 100
More importantly, contrary to what Justice Scalia argued in
his recent book, he does take into account changed circumstances when he engages in Constitutional interpretation. For
example, the issue in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 101 was whether the
Fourth Amendment allows the seizure of contraband detected
by a police officer during a protective search permissible under
Terry v. Ohio. 102 The Court held that the police officer violated
the ban on "unreasonable searches and seizures" by "'squeezing,
sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of the defendant's pocket' -a pocket which the officer already knew con. d no weapon. ,103
tame
Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion, the beginning of
which sounds very much like Part I of Professor Machen's article. Scalia began by saying that "I take it to be a fundamental
principle of constitutional adjudication that the terms in the
Constitution must be given the meaning ascribed to them at the
time of their ratification. " 104 Therefore, according to Scalia, the
right to be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures," must
be construed in light of what those words meant when the Constitution was adopted. 105 Scalia then suggested that he was not
sure whether the Terry rule, allowing a person to be frisked prior
to arrest to insure he has no hidden weapons, was a proper interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. He doubted that "the
fiercely proud men who adopted our Fourth Amendment would
have allowed themselves to be subjected, on mere suspicion of
being armed and dangerous, to such indignity .... " 106 But Scalia
went on to articulate an approach to this case strikingly similar
to the one advocated by Professor Machen in the second part of
100. See Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 Yale L.J. 427, 429-32 (1997) (argu·
ing that both Justice Scalia's and Justice Thomas' self-proclaimed originalism is inconsistent with declaring affirmative action programs unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the same Congress that approved that Amendment also funded
programs specifically for blacks.); Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in Scalia, Interpretation
at 80-81 (cited in note 13) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2838 (1992)).
101. 508 U.S. 366 (1993). The point of this discussion relating to Scalia's originalism
was first made in Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and The·
ory, 47 Stan L. Rev. 395 (1995).
102. 392 u.s. 1 (1%8).
103. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378.
104. !d. at 379 (Scalia, J ., concurring).
105. ld. at 379-80.
106. !d. at 381.
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his article. Justice Scalia said that, "even if a 'frisk' prior to arrest would have been considered impermissible in 1791 ... perhaps it is only since that time that concealed weapons capable of
harming the interrogator quickly ... have become commonwhich might alter the judgment of what is 'reasonable' under the
original standard." 107 In other words, even if the Framers had
specifically considered the validity of protective frisks before arrest, and even if they had decided that such frisks were invalid,
the identical issue may be decided differently by a later generation because of changes that have taken place since the Constitution was adopted. If, according to Scalia, the interpretation of
the word "unreasonable" to a given set of facts can change, why
can't the meaning of phrases like "cruel and unusual punishments," "equal protection," and "due process," also change? In
his Dickerson concurrence, Justice Scalia employed the same
"semantic originalism" advocated by Ronald Dworkin today and
envisioned by Professor Machen almost one hundred years ago.
The fact that Justice Scalia does not actually apply the
originalist approach he advocates in his academic writings to his
judicial decisions does not by itself mean that such a project is
impossible or wrong headed, just that Scalia is not committed to
it. The question is, does anyone consistently apply an approach
to constitutional interpretation where judges ignore changed circumstances and invalidate acts of the political branches only if
there is strong evidence that the Framers of the Constitution intended to prohibit the specific practice at issue? This kind of interpretive regime would sharply limit the judicial role with regard to most constitutional provisions and lead to a system of
strong judicial deference. Cass Sunstein, in his recent review of
Justice Scalia's book, outlined the likely results of this kind of
constitutional interpretation. 108 According to Sunstein, Scalia's
project, if carried out consistently, could lead to the overruling of
such cases as Brown v. Board of Education,'IJ'J and New York
Times v. Sullivan. 11 ° Furthermore, it could mean that sex discrimination would not be constitutionally objectionable; that the
Establishment Clause would not apply to the states; that the
Equal Protection Clause would not apply at all to the federal
107. Id. at 382 (emphasis added).
108. Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic Formalism, 107 Yale L.J. 529, 563
(1')')7).
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that actual malice is required for defamation of
public officials).
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government; and that "most of modern constitutional law, now
taken as constitutive of the American constitutional tradition by
Americans and non-Americans alike ... is illegitimate and fatally undemocratic. " 111
Professor Sunstein seems to assume that this kind of radical
approach to constitutional interpretation takes originalism more
seriously than an approach that argues that the Constitution's
principles must be applied to an ever-changing society. As Professor Machen suggested, however, we do not know whether the
Framers intended the open-ended provisions of the Constitution
to be given a fixed time-dated meaning or a variable one. 112 If
the Framers intended the latter, then strict originalism would be
inconsistent with itself. Moreover, the Supreme Court has almost always treated the "original understanding . . . as merely
one source of constitutional meaning among several, not a general theory of constitutional interpretation, much less the exclusive legitimate theory." 113
A true and sincere originalist could rationally conclude that
the Ninth Amendment, 114 and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause/ 15 demonstrate that the Framers of those texts believed
judges would define and enforce fundamental constitutional
rights not explicitly mentioned in the text and not necessarily in
existence at the founding. 116 Conversely, a sincere originalist
could argue that the framers never expected judges to have such
significant discretion in answering difficult moral and ethical
questions. 117 But these are all arguments about what the Constitution originally meant, not about whose intentions-the Fram111. Sunstein, 107 Yale L.J. at 564 (cited in note 108).
112. See notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
113. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1335, 1347 (1997).
114. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. Const., Amend. IX.
115. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. Const., Amend. XIV,§ 2.
116. See Perry, 77 Va. L. Rev. at 717 (cited in note 12) ("The indeterminacy of the
interpretative inquiry constitutive of the originalist approach is even greater ... if an aspect of the original meaning of the ninth amendment is that there are unenumerated constitutional rights against the federal government; or if the original meaning of the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment is to the effect that there are
particular, albeit unenumerated, constitutional rights ... against state governments.").
See also Suzanna Sherry, An Originalist Understanding of Minima/ism, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev.
175, 182 n.24 (1993) (arguing that framers may well have intended that judges enforce
natural rights).
117. See Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin's The Moral Reading of the Constitution:
A Critique, 72 Ind. L.J. 1099, 1100-02 (1997).
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ers or current judges-should control, or what role originalism
should play in constitutional interpretation. Originalism can lead
118
to very different systems of judicial review.
Moreover, there are very few scholars, and no judges, who
consistently apply a model of ~udicial review like the one de19
This kind of "[s]trict origiscribed by Professor Sunstein.
120
nalism is an interpretive methodology doomed to failure .... "
If constitutional interpretation were only about reconstructing
what the Framers thought about specific problems and then limiting judicial invalidation of contemporary political acts to those
practices the Framers thought unconstitutional, the "dead hand"
problem would emerge with a vengeance. 121 Why should today's
judges be governed by people who lived long ago in radically different circumstances? As Michael Klarman has said:
The ideological world of the Framers seems light years removed from our own. Most of them thought it acceptable to
hold property in human beings (and those who didn't were
prepared to compromise the issue). Virtually all of them believed that married women should be treated, in essence, as
the property of their husbands. The Founders generally assumed that people without property should not participate in
politics, either because they lacked a sufficient stake in the
community to justify their participation in its governance or
because their poverty deprived them of the independence
necessary for the exercise of responsible citizenship. The
Framers, as a group, were more deeply religious than Americans are today-a fact that undoubtedly predisposed the
Framers more toward a belief in natural law ... than today's
more cynical genera tion. 122

The Framers could not possibly have anticipated many of
the fundamental characteristics of our society-so why would we
defer to their opinions on problems they never could have understood? Because of this problem, few judges or scholars are
willing to rely completely on the understandings of the drafting

118. See Perry, 77 Va. L. Rev. at 712 (cited in note 12) (arguing that nothing in the
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation dictates whether a judge will believe
that she should take either a strong or passive role in fleshing out constitutional norms).
119. See Lessig, 47 Stan. L. Rev. at 439-40 (cited in note 101) (Even if "we could
imagine a practice that attempted to decide cases based upon original views of
uncontested matters, regardless of how those views have evolved ... it has never been
the practice of any court [to do so] and this for good reason.").
120. Barry Friedman, The Turn to History, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 928,961 (1997).
121. See notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
122. Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70S. Cal. L. Rev. 381,383-84 (1997).
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generations to resolve constitutional problems. Every "form of
originalism makes a choice about which of the changes in context ... will be accommodated in the current context. Some
changes are always accounted. The question is just which." 123
Because of the "dead hand" problem, even self-proclaimed
originalists concede that they are searching for the broad principles that were part of the original meaning and not trying to discover how the Framers would have decided specific cases. For
example, Judge Bork has said that "[t]he objection that we can
never know what the [framers] would have done about specific
modern situations is entirely beside the point. The originalist attempts to discern the principles the [framers] enacted, the values
124
they sought to protect. " Professor Machen also recognized this
point when he insisted that an ever-changing society governed
by vague constitutional language will have to accept that what
the Constitution meant yesterday in a given case (as opposed to
the principles the Constitution embodies), it might not mean tomorrow.12' By moving the level of generality from what the
Framers thought about specific questions to an examination of
the broad principles they set forth, originalists like Bork and
Machen can claim fidelity to original meaning but retain enough
discretion to incorporate contemporary moral evaluations into
constitutional interpretation. 126
Once strict originalism is taken off the table, and it has been
off the table for a long time, there are no stakes left to arguing
about the originalism question. The softer form of originalism
advocated by Professor Machen, Judge Bork, and Ronald
Dworkin, and the kind actually applied by Justice Scalia in his
decisions, 127 removes the constraint of original meanin§ as ap1
plied to open-textured constitutional interpretation.
This
move from specific intentions to general principles also eliminates any meaningful distinction between originalism and
nonoriginalism because the Constitution's broad phrases are de123. Lessig, 47 Stan L. Rev. at 440 (cited in note 101}.
124. Robert Bork, Original Intent and the Constitution, Humanities at 22, 26 (Feb.
1986) (cited in Perry, 77 Va. L. Rev. at 684 n.46 (cited in note 12)).
125. See notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
126. See John T. Valauri, The Varieties of Constitutional Theory: A Comment on
Perry and Hoy, 15 N. Ky. L. Rev. 499,505 (1988).
127. See notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
128. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 43, 93 (1989) ("(T]o be nonabsurd originalism must look to abstract intent but
looking to abstract intent does not eliminate judicial value choices"). See also Perry, 77
Va. L. Rev. at 711,716-18 (cited in note 12).
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fined at a level of generality that make them useless in hard
129
cases for anything other than symbolic purposes.
Judges can
use originalism to show fidelity to history and heritage, but at the
same time they must recognize that an originalist approach that
identifies broad principles instead of specific intentions does lit130
This is the truth
tle to resolve hard constitutional questions.
about originalism and there is little more to say about the question.131
II. BROWN AND ORIGINALISM
In a recent essay on affirmative action, Professor Jed
Rubenfeld of the Yale Law School commented that "no one today is a true equal protection originalist, because true equal protection originalism would repudiate Brown v. Board of Education."132 Professor Rubenfeld is a brilliant scholar who has
133
written numerous interesting articles on constitutional law.
Nevertheless, his statement about originalism and the Brown decision is overstated and reveals quite a bit about the dismal state
of the originalism debate.

129. See Solum, 63 Tul. L. Rev. at 1612-13 (cited in note 12) ("Under this conception of originalism, the application of a provision of the Constitution to a particular case
should be determined in light of the ·value' or 'principle' that prompted its adoption. But
nonoriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation also seek general values and principles. . . . If both the originalist and the nonoriginalist are looking for 'convictions.'
'principles,' and 'values' that prompted the adoption of the Constitution, what is the difference between what originalists and nonoriginalists do?'').
130. See Perry, 77 Va. L. Rev. at 711 (cited in note 12) ("Originalism runs out before
many of the most important constitutional conflicts that engage the judiciary are resolved.").
131. As mentioned earlier, the Supreme Court has never consistently adopted an
originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. I am currently working on a project
which will establish this point through a survey of Supreme Court cases. The following
are just a few of the important Supreme Court cases devoid of any serious originalist
analysis. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); R.A. V.
v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). On occasion, the Court does use an originalist
approach but invariably the Justices disagree on what the relevant history establishes.
See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857); South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996);
City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365
(1997).
132. Rubenfeld, 107 Yale L.J. at 432 (cited in note 100).
133. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, On Fidelity in Constitutional Law, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. 1469 (1997); Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 Yale L.J. 1119
(1995).

434

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 15:411

Let's unpack Professor Rubenfeld's statement. First, he assumes that a "true" originalist would have to find Brown was incorrectly decided. But this assumes a true originalist believes
that resort to original meaning is the only legitimate interpretative tool for judges exercising judicial review. However, as noted
earlier, it is virtually impossible to find anyone who really believes constitutional interpretation is only about the search for
134
original meaning. That kind of approach raises such significant
dead hand problems that few scholars, and no Supreme Court
Justices, embrace it.m If we define originalism to mean historical analysis is the exclusive method of constitutional interpretation, then Professor Rubenfeld is right-there are no true originalists. But that statement, like most discussions of originalism,
fails to advance the debate.
Professor Rubenfeld also ridicules the originalism of Robert
Bork, as well as others, who would approve of Brown on the basis that, by 1954, the equality the Framers believed in was "mutually inconsistent," with segregated schools, even if that had not
been the case in 1868. 136 Rubenfeld argues that "[o]riginalism is
no longer the method it [is] claimed to be if judges are free to
reject the specific understanding of a constitutional provision in
light of a more general putative 'purpose' such as 'equality."' 137
Although I agree that many originalists, such as Judge Bork and
Justice Scalia, employ the rhetoric of original meaning selectively, Professor Rubenfeld's theoretical argument is questionable. As Professor Machen told us one hundred years ago, although the principles underlying the Constitution do not change,
138
The
facts do, and therefore so do constitutional decisions.
Framers did not textually adopt the position that segregated
schools were constitutional. At most, they thought segregated
schools at the time did not violate the equal protection of the
laws. It is far from frivolous to suggest that, if the facts upon
134. See notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
135. See Sanford Levinson, The Limited Relevance of Originalism in the Actual Performance of Legal Roles, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 495, 495 (1995) ("(T]here is a surprisingly general consensus ... that originalism simply will not do as an exhaustive or
even a privileged theory of constitutional interpretation. It follows, therefore, that originalism sometimes legitimately loses out to other theories as to how to properly give
meaning to the complex web of understandings we call the United States Constitution.").
136. Rubenfeld, 107 Yale L.J. at 432 n.25 (cited in note 100) (citing Bork, Tempting
at 82 (cited in note 34)).
137. Id.
138. See notes 35-38 and accompanying text. I should note that Professor Rubenfeld
disclaims originalism as an interpretive tool. Rubenfeld, 107 Yale L.J. at 432 (cited in
note 100).
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which they made that assessment change, and if the relevant legal standard is as vague as "equal protection of the laws," future
courts might justifiably reach different conclusions. More importantly, contrary to Professor Rubenfeld's suggestion, that interpretation is no less "originalist," than the argument that
Brown was incorrectly decided because the Framers did not specifically believe segregation as it existed at the time violated
equal protection. Mark Tushnet made this point fifteen years
ago:
Suppose that we did turn back the clock so that we could talk
to the framers of the fourteenth amendment. If we asked
them whether the amendment outlawed segregation in public
schools, they would answer "No." But we could pursue our
conversation by asking them what they had in mind when
they thought about public education. We would find out that
they had in mind a relatively new and peripheral social institution . . . . In contrast, they thought that freedom of contract
was extremely important because it was the foundation of individual achievement, and they certainly wanted to outlaw racial discrimination with respect to this freedom. Returning to
1954 ... [o]ur hermeneutic enterprise has shown us that public education as it exists today- a central institution for the
achievement of individual goals-is in fact the functional
equivalent not of public education in 1868, but of freedom of
contract in 1868. Thus, Brown was correctly decided .... 1)9

It may be that judges should not engage in this type of interpretive exercise. Perhaps judges should simply ask whether
the Framers considered the specific question of segregated
schools and, if they did, and thought them constitutional, judges
should defer to those expectations. But, as discussed earlier, the
Supreme Court has never consistently engaged in that kind of
140
constitutional interpretation. The question is not simply what
the Framers thought about segregated schools, or for that matter, what they thought about frisking suspects who are detained
41
but not formally arrested/ but whether what they thought about
these questions still makes sense in light of changes they could
not have anticipated. This is the kind of originalist interpreta-

139. Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of /nterpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781,800-01 (1983).
140. See note 131.
141. See notes 101-107 and accompanying text.
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tion actually practiced by the Supreme Court, because it is the
only kind of originalism that makes any sense. 142
Professor Rubenfeld's recent comments about Brown and
originalism carry on a forty-three year tradition. 143 Thousands of
pages in law reviews and books have been devoted to this subject.144 The first such article appeared in 1955 and the debate is
145
still raging today.
Why? The Supreme Court did not rely on
original intent to decide Brown, although many scholars, including Ronald Dworkin, Michael McConnell, and Judge Bork,
argue it could have done so. Does anybody think the controversy
over Brown or the history of segregation in this country would
have been different had the Court decided the case based on
original intent? Would the South have been more receptive to
the Court's decision had it been steeped in history instead of
policy? Of course not. So why do scholars, both on the left and
the right, feel such a strong need to justify Brown through originalism, or to justify originalism through Brown? Since the Supreme Court decided the case with reference to contemporary
notions of racial and social equality, little has been gained by the
scholarly attempt to rewrite the decision to do the impossibleto justify (or to criticize) the case based purely on original meanmg.
So, what should commentators have said about the Brown
decision and its relationship to original meaning and history?
Lawrence Lessig of the Harvard Law School recently applied his
theory of "translation" to this question in a helpful and interesting way. 146 In this article, Lessig did not attempt to justify or
142. See Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, The Courts, and the Question of Minima/ism, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 84,86-87 (1993).
143. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregration Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
144. See, e.g., Walter E. Dellinger, Ill, School Segregation and Professor Avins'
History: A Defense of Brown v. Board of Education, 38 Miss. L.J. 248 (1%7); John P.
Frank and Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 1972 Wash. U. L.Q. 421, 456-67; Alfred H. Kelly, The Fourteenth Amendment
Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1049 (1956); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 213, 252
(1991); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response
to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1881 (1995); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1165,1242-43 (1993); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 457 (19%); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Klarman, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1937 (1995).
145. See Bickel, 69 Harv. L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 143); McConnell, 91 Va. L. Rev.
at 1 (cited in note 144).
146. Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1365, 1367, 1420-
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criticize Brown based on what the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment did or did not believe. Nor did he discuss the legitimacy of various methods of constitutional interpretation.
Rather, he tried to describe how the equality principle contained
in the Fourteenth Amendment came to mean something different in 1954 than it meant in 1896. In other words, he attempted
to understand how a change in the factual context led to a
change in a legal decision.
Lessig argued that racism was an important part of American society in the late nineteenth century. Racism was not a
choice but was "how people saw the world-how normal people
saw the world. To deny or question racism didn't make you curious, or clever. To deny it made you weird. " ~ Racism was
prevalent within biology, anthropology, psychology, and the social sciences. It was, in short, part of an "overlapping consensus"
throughout society.' 48
Over time, as the twentieth century moved forward, the unquestioned assumptions of our racist society slowly started to
melt away. "This erosion was felt first within science, where the
principles of scientific racism were effectively challenged ....
One by one, areas where science proved the inferiority of the
black race were areas where this proof was drawn into doubt.
The old views were rejected, or at least contested." 149 Moreover,
after World War II, our defeat of Hitler and his racism made our
own seem all the more hypocritical.';o When the Court finally
faced the Plessy issue again, all that supported segregation was
"a remote and opportunistic doctrine of stare decisis, tied to the
bare claim that the police power has always permitted states to
order social spheres according to their perception of morality . . . . But these justifications were just too thin. However
controversial, the command of the Equal Protection Clause demanded an answer." 151 That answer, provided by an unanimous
Supreme Court, was that official state-required segregation was
inconsistent with the equality principle of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Professor Lessig's project is consistent with Professor Machen's constitutional philosophy. The Fourteenth Amendment
1

24 (1997).
147. Id. at 1421.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1422.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1423.
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sets forth a principle of equality that does not change over time,
but the society to which that principle applies does change. How
we feel about butter and margarine might change, 152 and-much
more important of course-how we feel about racial discrimination changes. These social debates inevitably influence judicial
decisions far more than scholarly interpretations of the constitutional text or the specific intentions of the Framers. Lessig's descriptive account of how the Supreme Court changed its views
on the application of the Equal Protection Clause sounds plausible because it is not based on a controversial reading of text and
history, but rather on an overarching theory of why the Supreme
Court could have believed in 1954 that official racial discrimination had become unequal and unjust under the equality principle
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lessig's account also recognizes that a proper use of history
in constitutional interpretation requires a study, not just of the
original meaning of constitutional language, but of how that
meaning has been applied over the full course of American history.153 Interpretations inevitably evolve because judges must
apply vague constitutional norms to a society whose institutions
and values are constantly changing. This point, which prominent
scholars such as Larry Kramer and Barry Friedman are currently
making with great force, 154 was also made by Professor Machen
almost one hundred years ago when he recognized that constitutional decisions depend as much upon the factual context at the
time of the case as the applicable legal principle. 155 Whether this
is true because the Framers intended that the vague norms they
established must be interpreted over time, as Ronald Dworkin
argues, or because the nature of judging does not allow us to be
ruled by people who lived centuries ago, does not really matter.
What separates us is not the question of the relevance of history
to constitutional interpretation, but rather what our history, traditions, and reason teach us about fundamental values and which
political institutions should define and enforce those values. It is
152. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
153. See Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History-and Through It, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1627, 1628 (1997) ("[W]hile I believe that history matters very much in constitutional
interpretation ... the history that matters is not limited to Founding moments but must
include subsequent developments as well."). See also Barry Friedman, The Sedimentary
Constitution, U. Pa. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1999) ("history is essential to interpretation of
the Constitution, but the relevant history is not just that of the founding, it is all of
American history.").
154. ld.
155. See Machen, 14 Harv. L. Rev. at 273 (cited in note 2).

1998]

THE END OF THE ORIGINALISM DEBATE

439

upon those difficult issues, not the appropriate role of original
meaning in constitutional interpretation, that legal scholars and
judges should focus their considerable energies.
CONCLUSION
There have been numerous law review articles and books
written in the last twenty years devoted to the subject of originalism and constitutional interpretation. This focus on a question largely irrelevant to how the Supreme Court decides cases is
truly unfortunate. As Professor Machen told us a long time ago,
an ever-changing society governed by a vague foundational
document will require judicial decisions that apply new circumstances to old rules. History and custom will be important to
that application, but not decisive. Judges do not have to choose
between a Living Constitution and the dead hand, but they must
inevitably make difficult judgments about competing institutional roles and fundamental rights and liberties. Those are the
truly hard questions of constitutional law, and it is time that we
face them without the baggage of an old and unhelpful debate
about the relationship between original meaning and constitutional interpretation.

